

## **BAD BLOOD: THE FINAL CHAPTER**

### **EPISODE 5: FAKE IT 'TIL YOU MAKE IT**

---

**Moira Gunn:** What's the status of the device today? Is it still just a prototype, or are you... Where are you?

**Elizabeth Holmes:** We... OK, so our first applications are actually in monitoring acute painkillers and that device is going into sort of the production phase. We hope to release it actually to a pharmaceutical partner around mid to late this year.

**Moira Gunn:** So you're almost there. You're almost in manufacture?

**Elizabeth Holmes:** Oh, absolutely.

**That was Elizabeth Holmes being interviewed on a radio show called Biotech Nation by Dr. Moira Gunn. The year was 2005 and Theranos was barely more than a year old.**

**Elizabeth was just 21 at the time. And she was years away from having a marketable product. In fact, her product kept changing. It started out as a wristband called the “TheraPatch” that would diagnose what ailed you and administer the appropriate drug. When it became clear a few months into her startup that this magic wristband was basically science fiction, Elizabeth pivoted to the “Theranos 1.0,” a handheld device inspired by the glucose monitors for diabetes patients.**

**That's the device she was telling Dr. Gunn was, "going into the production phase, and about to be released to a pharmaceutical client."**

**But that was stretching the truth. It would be another two years before Theranos fielded the device in a pilot study with a pharmaceutical company and that study would fail. Elizabeth's boasts to Dr. Gunn were the wishful thinking of a naïve and inexperienced entrepreneur. A wide-eyed novice who underestimated and papered over challenges. But it was also the type of thinking her environment encouraged.**

**From its earliest days in the 1950s, Silicon Valley has been a place where entrepreneurs set ambitious goals and push themselves to meet them. Over the years, that boldness has bred arrogance and hubris.**

**<< News clip montage >>**

**Objectives that aren't realistic are portrayed as not just achievable, but assured. Products that are just prototypes are presented as finished and ready to ship.**

**Contrary to what Elizabeth told Dr. Gunn, the "Theranos 1.0" never went into large-scale production. Neither did its successors, the 2.0 and the 3.0. It would be another *eight* years before she went to market with a product. But even that device, which she codenamed the**

**Edison, was so limited and error-prone that she had to secretly replace it with third-party machines.**

**Other tech startup founders had gotten away with behaving this way, so why not her? As she told another interviewer nine years later:**

**Elizabeth Holmes:** This is how they make 'em in Silicon Valley, as you know.

**It's this culture, as much as Elizabeth herself, that's on trial in a San Jose courtroom. For decades, Silicon Valley has been a virtual law enforcement-free zone. Despite a litany of scandals, few founders or CEOs have been held to account.**

**This case could change that.**

**But that all depends on how the twelve-person jury views the case. If it sees Elizabeth Holmes as a well-meaning entrepreneur who made some innocent mistakes and got ahead of herself, I expect things to only get worse.**

**But if it agrees with the prosecution that she took things too far and knowingly committed fraud, it will send a powerful message to Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. If you lie and cut corners, if you go too far in flouting laws and regulations, if you jeopardize lives in the pursuit of your ambition, you *will* go to prison.**

**This is *Bad Blood: The Final Chapter*. I'm John Carreyrou. On today's episode we'll hear from two people who saw, up close, how Elizabeth was drawn early on to a very specific type of entrepreneurship. A type of entrepreneurship, that according to prosecutors, led her down a path to crime.**

**That's after the break.**

**PREROLL BREAK  
SEG A**

**To really, fully understand the Theranos story—to understand how a young woman who started out with the noble goal of saving lives ended up putting people in harm's way—you have to understand the environment that molded her.**

**Elizabeth Holmes didn't happen in a vacuum. She was the product of a culture. A culture that thrives on hype and exaggeration. A culture that exalts rule-breaking as a virtue. A culture that has become defined by an expression: Fake it 'til you make it.**

**A couple of years after Elizabeth started her company, a friend of her father's introduced her to Don Lucas, a well-known venture capitalist. Lucas was one of Silicon Valley's pioneers. He started investing in startups in 1957, fourteen years before the term "Silicon Valley" was even invented.**

**Lucas took Elizabeth under his wing and became chairman of Theranos' board. He was impressed by his protégé's intelligence, but he was mindful that she was still very young and inexperienced. So he recruited an older executive to chaperone her and teach her the ropes.**

**This executive's name was Diane Parks. She was a pharmaceutical industry veteran who'd last worked at Genentech, the South San Francisco biotech giant known for creating synthetic insulin. Elizabeth made a good first impression on Diane.**

**Diane Parks:** She was delightful. She was energetic. She had a vision of where she wanted to take a company.

**The two worked well together at first, but Diane's voice was soon drowned out by someone else.**

**Don Lucas's biggest claim to fame as an investor was that he'd mentored and funded the software billionaire Larry Ellison. So, it was only natural that the old man would want to introduce Elizabeth to Ellison.**

**Larry Ellison is one of Silicon Valley's greatest success stories and in the early days of his company Oracle he got away with... a lot. For instance, he named the *first* version of Oracle's database software "Version 2" to make it seem further along than it was.**

**Bruce Scott, an early Oracle employee, said in a Bloomberg documentary that Ellison made no bones about misleading clients. It helped Oracle grow its sales fast and that's what mattered most in Silicon Valley.**

**Bruce Scott:** I remember him telling me very distinctly one time, "Bruce, we can't be successful unless we lie to customers."

**After meeting Elizabeth, Ellison decided to invest in Theranos and he occasionally dropped by its offices in East Palo Alto in his red Porsche. His influence was quickly felt. Some early Theranos employees I interviewed told me Elizabeth would often begin sentences with "Larry says..."**

**The fast and loose, charisma-driven world Larry Ellison came from was foreign to Diane Parks. She barely knew Ellison and was oblivious to the ambient Silicon Valley hubris. All she cared about was Theranos' business. And at the heart of that business was Elizabeth's vision of a device that could do dozens of tests on a tiny drop of blood.**

**Diane Parks:** She had a... an idea. And I loved the idea, but she had no product.

**What Theranos had was a very early prototype.**

**Diane Parks:** This was a black box. And I didn't, I don't have a real, you know, brain for electronics. And I couldn't figure out how this thing was working or if it was working because I never saw it fully demonstrated. So, I started working

more closely with some of the scientists that were developing the tool and finding that we were a very long way from having a tool that would actually work.

**About a year into her tenure at Theranos, Diane accompanied Elizabeth on a trip to Switzerland. Larry Ellison had introduced Elizabeth to Ernesto Bertarelli, the billionaire CEO of Swiss biotech firm Serono. They were yachting buddies.**

**The hope was that Theranos could interest Serono in using its device to monitor the blood values of patients in one of its clinical trials. But at this stage, it was just an idea. Theranos would need to continue working out the kinks in its device to get it to work reliably.**

**Elizabeth and Diane met with Bertarelli at his office in Geneva.**

**Diane Parks:** And he was kind enough to see us. And we went in, and we even had the prototype with us of the machine, which we never even took out of the box.

**Diane deferred to Elizabeth and let her do the talking. But as her young charge launched into her presentation, she watched with growing discomfort.**

**Diane Parks:** Pretty much, she was saying it was ready to go, it was fully capable of entering their clinical trials tomorrow. And I was really taken aback because by no means were we ready to send this equipment to them, nor was it... It had never been validated and, in my opinion, did not work. We were really just, you know, kind of selling something that didn't exist.

**Bertarelli politely listened to Elizabeth's pitch, but Diane got the distinct feeling he didn't believe her.**

**Diane Parks:** He was kind, he didn't interrupt. But I could just tell from his body language he was not buying what we were saying, what Elizabeth was saying.

**By the time the meeting ended, Diane was mortified and outraged. She managed to keep up a calm façade until they exited the building. But as soon as they were on the sidewalk outside, she chastised Elizabeth.**

**Diane Parks:** My reputation after 20 years in the industry was at stake and I said, you know, we can't sell something that we don't have. You know, we can't purport to have a finished product until it's finished.

**Elizabeth was unfazed. And her response stunned Diane.**

**Diane Parks:** She said, "But that's how we're going to make it. You have to fake it 'til you make it. And that's what Bill Gates has done. That's what Steve Jobs did."

**Diane was annoyed. She replied that she didn't care what Elizabeth thought Gates and Jobs had done, this sort of behavior was simply not appropriate.**

**But Elizabeth was right, in a way. Bill Gates and Steve Jobs *had* cut corners at times when they were just starting out. When Microsoft offered to provide IBM with an operating system for its new PC in 1980, it didn't have one. It was still in the process of negotiating to buy the operating system of a computer company in Seattle. That sleight of hand was the foundation of its software empire.**



**When Atari asked Steve Jobs to build a prototype of an arcade game in the mid-1970s, he got his friend and future Apple cofounder Steve Wozniak to do the work for him and secretly pocketed the bonus Atari had promised.**

**Elizabeth's mentor, Larry Ellison, would sell early customers versions of Oracle's software that hadn't been built yet, according to his biographer Mike Wilson. These dubious sales tactics were embraced by other software makers and gave rise to the term "vaporware."**

**But Jobs, Gates, Ellison, they all hailed from the computer industry. Elizabeth's product wasn't a computer or a software program, it was a medical device.**

**Diane Parks:** In healthcare, when you're talking about someone's life, there is no faking it 'til you make it. You have to prove that you have something and test it and make sure there's no harm.

**Diane realized that she and Elizabeth were on completely different wavelengths. Diane's world, the world she'd worked in for two decades, was the world of medicine. A world that was highly regulated, where the client was the patient. But Elizabeth, she was modeling herself after a different world. The fast and loose world of computer entrepreneurs.**

**Diane Parks:** She knew everything about those people and the technology. I mean, I think it's why she chose Stanford. It's who she emulated. She was well

read about what they had done. I doubt she knew much about leaders in healthcare. At all.

**The meeting with Bertarelli laid bare the disconnect between Diane and Elizabeth, and there was no bridging it.**

**Diane Parks:** It was clear I was on the out from there with her and she was on the outs with me. And so, we parted company pretty quickly.

**With Diane gone, it seemed like there was no one left to remind Elizabeth that the industry she was operating in was healthcare and that her actions could affect peoples' lives.**

**In fact, going forward, she would look even more to the tech world for inspiration. More specifically, she would become consumed with emulating one computer entrepreneur above all others.**

**That's after the break.**

**BREAK 1**

**SEG B**

**Around the time Diane Parks left Theranos, a new board member joined its board of directors. And like Diane, this new board member saw the road Elizabeth was taking and tried to intervene.**

**This new board member was Avie Tevanian, one of Steve Jobs's oldest friends. Avie had worked with Jobs for two decades, first at NeXT, the computer company Jobs had created in the 1980's after being ousted from Apple, and then again at Apple when Jobs had returned there in 1997.**

**There were few people who knew Jobs as well as Avie did and that's what made him such a catch to Elizabeth. Jobs had become her idol. She referred to Theranos' prototype as the "iPod of healthcare" and predicted that, like Apple's ubiquitous products, it would someday be in every household in the country. She became so obsessed with Jobs that she even began dressing like him, showing up at work every day in a black turtleneck.**

**As a veteran of Silicon Valley, Avie knew that hyping and overpromising are a common part of the Valley playbook when an entrepreneur is just starting out. So, at first it didn't bother him that Elizabeth's blood-testing machine was a work in progress.**

**Avie Tevanian:** When you're not established, you need to have a way to sort of sell the dream. Whether you're raising money, getting people to support you in any way possible, you are literally selling the dream. And, if you're charismatic and you've got a great story, then you can sell it.

**So Avie understood exaggerating at the beginning. But eventually, founders need to back up their claims. That wasn't happening at Theranos. Every quarter, Avie and other members of the board**

**would get together for a meeting and Elizabeth would stage a demo of her device.**

**Avie Tevanian:** So she would prick her finger and blood would go somewhere, maybe... it might not even go in the machine. And, you know, pipettes would move around and all kinds of things would happen. But invariably, by the end of the demo, it would be obvious that it didn't work. For companies that are just developing a new product, a lot of that is normal. You expect that to happen for a certain amount of time. In the case of Theranos, it was really, you know, every time we'd see another demo and now we're talking about a period of over a year, there was really no overall forward progress.

**By this point, Avie was worried. He'd invested \$1.5 million of his own money in Theranos and the technology didn't seem to be getting anywhere. Ex-colleagues of his from Apple, who now worked at Theranos, were confiding in him that things weren't going well. And the updates Elizabeth offered at board meetings were getting harder and harder to believe.**

**Elizabeth had been giving the board increasingly rosy projections about the revenues Theranos would earn from leasing its blood-testing technology to drug makers. But the projected revenues never seemed to materialize.**

**Avie Tevanian:** We heard about contracts that were signed, and then three months later, they're still about to be signed. And as a board member, you know, I took to asking questions like most would and I finally got to the point where I said, "can I see what the current status of the contract? I mean, can I... can I literally see the words on the page?" And I was told "no." So that was not a good sign.

**Elizabeth's excuse was that the contracts were under legal review.**

**Avie Tevanian:** Which, of course, is completely ridiculous, anyway. They're always under legal review. It seemed bogus because the board can see anything that the company's doing. That and a couple of things just set her off basically against me.

**A company's board of directors has oversight over a CEO. If it's not happy with her, it can hold her to account and even fire her. But that's not what happened at Theranos. When Avie asked to see those pharmaceutical contracts, Elizabeth iced him out. She gave him the silent treatment for several weeks. Then, she let it be known that she wanted him gone. Avie was surprised but not cowed. He set up a meeting with Don Lucas, the board's chairman and the one person who could overrule Elizabeth.**

**Avie Tevanian:** I said, "Don, I've done a lot of research here. I think Elizabeth is... is a big part of the problem. If you want me to stay on the board, I'll do that and help you fix the problem." We didn't explicitly talk about replacing Elizabeth as CEO, but it was pretty obvious. And I said, "Do you want me to stay and help or do you want me to resign?" and he said, "Why don't you resign."

**Avie decided he didn't need the aggravation and did what he was asked. But on his way out, he sent Don a letter asking him to inform the other board members of what had happened. In the letter, he wrote that they deserved to know that by not going along with Elizabeth 100 percent they, "risk retribution from the company slash Elizabeth."**

**The way Avie was abruptly pushed off the board would play out again and again with Theranos employees over the next eight years.**

**Elizabeth created a corporate culture in which constructive feedback wasn't welcome, even though some of her employees had Ph.D.'s and were much more knowledgeable than she was about diagnostics.**

**The myth of the brilliant entrepreneur who succeeds by ignoring the naysayers is strong in Silicon Valley.**

**Elizabeth told one of her employees that a piece of advice Larry Ellison gave her was *not* to listen to her scientists when they told her something couldn't be done. If he'd listened to his programmers' never-ending complaints, Oracle never would have become the success it did, he told her.**

**Steve Jobs, too, was famous for not taking no for an answer and driving his employees to achieve what they didn't think was possible. In his biography of the late Apple founder, Walter Isaacson described this special power as Jobs's "reality distortion field."**

**Elizabeth took this lore to heart. She regarded employees who raised too many objections as cynics. They were either marginalized or fired. This led to a huge amount of turnover, which hurt the company's ability to make progress with its technology. It also ensured that she remained in a bubble, cut off from reality. Avie says this was misreading Jobs's legacy.**

**Avie Tevanian:** Maybe she took him a little bit too literally. Because the fact of the matter is, scientists, engineers, similar boats. A lot of times they will push back. And they will say, I can't get that done or I can't get it done next week or

whatever. And there's a back and forth that goes on. And you know what? Sometimes they've got a good answer where it really can't be done. It's just not possible. And then as a leader, you back off, reset, whatever.

### **He cites his own experience with Jobs.**

**Avie Tevanian:** If something was going on at Apple when I was working for Steve and he was pushing for something and I got on the phone with him and said, "Steve, we just can't do this, end of discussion," he would understand, OK. Because he would trust me to know whether something was possible or not.

### **The comparisons to Jobs were wrong, but they led people to leave their skepticism at the door when it came to Elizabeth. Part of the problem is that people badly *wanted* Elizabeth to be the real deal.**

**Avie Tevanian:** She's charismatic, she's got all these great supporters, she's got all these great investors, her board is all top-notch people. We've got, you know, a female who's in a great leadership position doing something wonderful. It checked a lot of boxes, but it didn't check the most important box, which is does it even work? No one ever really asked that question, I think, until you kind of looked at it more skeptically.

### **Except for Avie. He continued asking himself that question as he kept tabs on Theranos from afar.**

**Avie Tevanian:** Watching over the years, I would watch new investment come in, things like that, and always wonder, did she kind of figure it out?

### **When he heard patients were getting their blood tested, ostensibly by Theranos devices, in Arizona and California, he began second-guessing his instincts.**

**Avie Tevanian:** How could she be in all these, all these stores with this product and it not actually work now? Again, not seeing any direct evidence that it worked, but I was beginning to believe that it worked.

**That's how investors who came to Theranos much later than Avie and who invested far greater sums were conned. Elizabeth had taken her lies to new extremes. She'd faked it for a decade. To the point of bringing to market a machine, a medical product, that Theranos's own lab directors deemed unreliable. Since no one could fathom something like that happening, telling a lie that big, everyone assumed that if her blood tests were being used by everyday people, they *had to* work. Even a former board member like Avie, who'd seen up close how Elizabeth operated.**

**After Avie left Theranos's board, a new executive joined the company who had an outsized influence on Elizabeth. Someone who, rather than steer her away from her computer industry fixation, diagnosed healthcare as a software problem.**

**That's when things really went off the rails.**

**More, after the break.**

**BREAK 2  
SEG C**

**Sunny Balwani:** My background is software. And I... I... the more I looked at this problem — maybe because, you know, when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail — to me, this looked like a software problem.



**Sunny Balwani was Elizabeth's live-in boyfriend when she pushed Avie Tevanian off the board in 2007. She often brought her work home, Sunny testified to the SEC, and he became intrigued. The real opportunity, Sunny decided, was not in blood testing per se. It was in using machine learning to predict medical outcomes.**

**Sunny Balwani:** There's so much health data and nobody's doing any data mining on it to see what are the patterns? Can you... just like Google Maps, you can see a car driving and we can predict, you know, when you're going to get somewhere. Why is it that from lab results and health diagnostic information... why is it we cannot predict people's health?

**In the summer of 2009, Sunny joined Theranos as president and chief operating officer. And he began pushing Elizabeth to think of Theranos as a data-mining software company.**

**Sunny Balwani:** And the more I dug into it, the more I was convinced this is a pure software problem. Of course, there's diagnostics and and, you know, other things to that. But software was going to be the key of how this is going to grow...

**And Elizabeth bought into the idea. She later told the SEC she thought of Theranos as "a sensors and software company."**

**Elizabeth Holmes:** The purpose of what we tried to do with getting people access to the health data is so that they can use it, hopefully, for purposes of early detection. And the way that will be realized is through models and algorithms and we saw that as the ultimate product for the company.

**But Elizabeth and Sunny were getting ahead of themselves. They were trying to run before they could crawl. Those models and algorithms to help doctors and patients detect diseases early, they'd**

be of no use if the blood data wasn't accurate. And what would make the data accurate had nothing to do with software. It had to do with biochemistry and engineering. Under Sunny's influence, Elizabeth was focusing on the *wrong* thing.

A common practice in the software industry is to release products before they're finished. The industry even has a term for it: beta testing. The beta version of a software program still has bugs in it. Early users are like guinea pigs. They help the programmer find the bugs and fix them.

This software industry mentality has led Silicon Valley to embrace real-life experimentation. If you're ever in Mountain View, the town where Google is headquartered, you may encounter cars driving around with no one at the wheel. They're being tested by Google's sister company, Waymo.

There's a darker side to this real-world testing. Three years ago, a driverless car being tested by Uber struck a woman who was walking her bike across a street in Tempe, Arizona. She was rushed to a hospital where she died of her injuries. According to a National Transportation Safety Board report on the accident, Uber's self-driving system hadn't been programmed to deal with the very common real-world occurrence of jaywalking.

**Sunny, a self-proclaimed software guy who had spent a decade working at Lotus and Microsoft, saw no reason why they couldn't do the same type of real-world testing with Theranos' blood tests.**

**So, in the fall of 2013, Theranos went live with a jury-rigged system of malfunctioning proprietary devices and third-party machines it had rushed to modify for small-sample testing.**

**In the process, it brought real-life experimentation to a new frontier: healthcare. The guinea pigs were no longer software users, they were patients.**

**There's no question Elizabeth and Sunny knew they were experimenting on patients. Government court filings show that in the months after Theranos started offering its blood tests in Walgreens stores, subordinates sent them a number of emails about erroneous patient results. In one email, Elizabeth's own brother, Christian Holmes, asked her to consider putting a halt to some of the testing. She didn't follow his suggestion.**

**Some people don't see a problem with this. Tim Draper, the prominent venture capitalist who wrote Elizabeth her first \$1 million check when she dropped out of Stanford, is one of them.**

**Tim Draper:** All she had to do was, you know, say this was a beta or whatever, and all of us would be using it, we'd be loving it.

**Beta testing on live patients. That's an interesting notion.**

**Avie Tevanian:** The similar thing for them to have done would have been to say, we have these blood tests, they're not totally reliable, but go and try them, right. And we'll fix them over time. Which is what, I mean that's kind of what the software industry does. They release the product that's like, we know it's pretty good. There's a few features we haven't implemented yet, but you can start using it now. Now, of course, from a customer perspective, that makes no sense in the medical world, but that is the equivalent of what they should have done.

**In the medical world, what Avie just described is called a clinical study. Patients are recruited to participate and are given forms to read and sign, acknowledging they understand what they're getting into. To ensure its safety, the study is overseen by an Institutional Review Board. Its results are then published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, where everyone can examine the data and judge whether the drug or medical device tested worked. Elizabeth and Sunny could have gone this route, but they scrupulously avoided it.**

**Draper, a frequent guest on CNBC who exemplifies how many in Silicon Valley think, seems to be oblivious to these important distinctions. To the likes of Draper, what Elizabeth did was no worse than releasing a buggy version of the iPhone operating system. Like Apple does with its updates, Theranos would have ironed out the bugs. Eventually.**

**Except no one's life is in danger when Apple releases a buggy version of iOS.**

**With a medical device, patients' lives are in the balance.**

**Maria Shriver:** Today, Theranos has performed more than six million blood tests and it's made Holmes rich. But now serious questions about the accuracy of those tests. According to regulators, the lab posed immediate jeopardy to patient safety.

**Holmes's trial will show that at least one patient received a false HIV result. Other patients received results suggesting they had prostate cancer when they were in fact healthy. Theranos had to void or correct nearly one million blood test results, affecting the medical diagnoses of thousands of patients.**

**But in the view of people like Tim Draper, progress is impeded when there are too many rules and regulations. Draper was one of the first investors in Hotmail, Skype, Tesla and SpaceX. And he's pretty much one of the last people still defending Elizabeth. To hear him tell it, she wasn't a crook, she was a pioneer. An agent of change.**

**Tim Draper:** For all of those people who went after her and tried and destroyed Theranos, there are... there are ten more entrepreneurs that are all getting funded now. They're going to do the same thing. We're eventually going to change health care as we know it. And she will have had a huge hand in making that happen.

**On paper, this trial is about whether Elizabeth defrauded investors and patients. But more broadly, it's about whether there are limits to what entrepreneurs can get away with. At what point do hyping and overpromising become harmful? When does bending the rules**

**become breaking the law? How far can an entrepreneur fake it before it's no longer deemed acceptable?**

**Those are the questions underpinning this trial. In the name of innovation, Silicon Valley has been pushing the boundaries of ethical behavior further and further. This jury will have to decide whether Elizabeth finally took things too far.**

**Because, somewhere on the continuum between the economic status quo and completely unfettered innovation, it seems to me, there's a line not to cross.**

**I asked Avie where he thinks that line lies.**

**Avie Tevanian:** I mean, look, it might be different for everybody. I think an easy one is when you are just out and out lying to people. You know, for me, I would never want to cross that line. There are some people who will cross that line and think that it's OK. It's not OK with me and, you know, I don't want to... I don't want to really deal with people who will do that.

**If he'd been in Elizabeth's shoes, would he have gone live with those blood tests in the fall of 2013?**

**Avie Tevanian:** I can't even believe you're asking that question. Of course not. I mean, any reasonable person who knew that you were going to do medical tests that didn't work, putting that out there, I mean, no. I mean, that that's just crazy.

**CREDITS**

**Bad Blood: The Final Chapter is a Three Uncanny  
Four production. The show is hosted by me, John Carreyrou.**

**Our show is produced by Lena Richards, Rahima Nasa, and  
Jennifer Sigl with help from Shane McKeon. Emily Saul is our  
reporter. Rachel B. Doyle edited.**

**Laura Mayer is our executive producer. The show was mixed by Kevin  
Seaman. Casey Holford composed the theme music.**

**I hope you've been enjoying Bad Blood: The Final Chapter. And I'd  
love to hear your thoughts on the show. Your feedback goes a long  
way. It helps us make the best show we can make and it only takes a  
few minutes. Just head to Bad Blood dot fans on the browser of your  
choice to answer a few questions. We're looking forward to hearing  
from you.**

**And, if you like the show, head over to Apple Podcasts, Spotify,  
Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts and hit subscribe. Leave  
a rating and a comment while you're there. It really helps new  
listeners find the show.**

**Thanks for listening. We'll be back next week.**